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This paper introduces and formally models the variable value environment and proposes
an auction mechanism appropriate for it. In the variable value environment, bidders’
private values may change over time as a result of both private actions and exogenous
shocks. Examples of private actions and exogenous shocks are complementary
investments and exogenous changes in bidder's business, respectively. We consider a
three-period model of the variable value environment where agents receive signals about
their values in the first and the third periods and in the second period they take actions.
This setting captures essential features of auctions of objects available for use at a future
date (e.g., a sale of a military base scheduled to close in a few years). We study
mechanisms that lead to efficient allocations, i.e. those in which the final value of the
object to the winning bidder net of the total cost of private actions undertaken by all
agents is maximized. We characterize the first best allocation, and propose a mechanism
that yields the first best allocation in equilibrium. This mechanism has an inefficient
pooling equilibrium along with an efficient separating equilibrium. To rule out the
pooling equilibrium, we introduce a class of ε-efficient mechanisms that force players to
coordinate on the separating equilibrium. We prove that one can always choose an ε-
efficient mechanism that yields an efficient allocation with probability arbitrarily close to
one.
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Auction environments investigated in the economic literature can be viewed
as a mixture of three basic types of auctions: common value auctions, private
value auctions, and multi-unit auctions where objects may be complements
or substitutes.1 The above-mentioned environments assume that the value
of an object for each bidder is determined exogenously. These environments
do not allow the bidder’s private value to be in‡uenced by private actions
taken prior to the …nal stage of the auction.
Consider a problem of allocating an object that will be available for use
at some future date, for example a sale of a hypothetical military base that
is scheduled to close in twenty years. What is an e¢cient mechanism for
selling it? Waiting with the sale for twenty years and auctioning o¤ the
base immediately before it becomes available probably creates an ine¢ciency,
because the winning bidder might have missed opportunities to invest in
assets complementary to the base ownership. In other words, private actions
that a bidder chooses prior to the actual sale may in‡uence her private value.
If a bidder thinks that her likelihood of winning the object is su¢ciently low,
she would choose not to take costly actions that increase her valuation of
the object.2 On the other extreme, selling the base twenty years before it
becomes available seems absurd, because the expected value of the object for
1Klemperer (2000) is the most comprehensive collection of both classical and recent
papers in auction theory, including private and common value environments. E¢cient
auctions with bidders having interdependent value are studied most recently in Ausubel
(1998), Perry and Reny (1999), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu
(2000), and others.
2Alternatively, a bidder may be able to take a free action that increases her value for
the object, but decreases her utility from not getting the object. For example, a bidder
may sign a contract that is very pro…table if the base belongs to the …rm, but unpro…table
otherwise. Formally, a costly action increasing the value of the asset is equivalent to a free
action that lower the reservation utility conditional on not getting an object.
1each bidder is likely to change over time; thus, e¢ciently allocating an object
a long time before it becomes available for use is an unlikely possibility.3 In
other words, as long as there are privately observed exogenous shocks to
private values that are revealed over time, auctioning o¤ the object well
in advance (before the exogenous shocks are observed) may be ine¢cient.
One may argue that as long as there is resale opportunity the object should
be auctioned o¤ as early as possible and then “the market will allocate it
e¢ciently”. However, this argument is ‡awed on two counts: First, the seller
will set a reservation price that is “too high” to be e¢cient (e.g., Myerson
and Satterthwaite, 1983). Second, and most importantly for the current
analysis, selling the object early counting on the original buyer to re-allocate
the object simply moves the burden of designing an allocation mechanism
from one party to the other.
Changes in private values due to private actions and exogenous shocks are
ubiquitous. We will refer to an auction environment where individual values
may change over time as a result of both private actions and exogenous shocks
as the variable value environment. Private actions, for instance complemen-
tary investments, change the private value of an object; and so do exogenous
shocks ranging from changes in demand and input prices to changes in tax
laws and regulatory environment. In fact, a sale of almost any object or
service available for use at some known future date is an example of the
variable value environment. (Examples of variable value setting range from
leasing a building or a military base to renting a dance club for New Year’s
Eve.) A sale of an object in a market where search is important inevitably
has elements of the variable value environment. Indeed, consider the sale
of house A that is scheduled to be auctioned o¤ in 20 days. Before house
A becomes available bidders may have opportunities to buy other houses,
3Bidders’ expected value of an object is likely to change over time depending on the
developments in the bidders’ business.
2essentially removing themselves from the market. Thus, we can consider an
action consisting of “not buying some other reasonably priced house” as an
action that boosts the value of the house. A second price auction (or any
other single-round auction mechanism) is bound to be ine¢cient in a mar-
ket with search because in the variable environment information revelation
is necessary for achieving e¢ciency. The model of the variable value envi-
ronment not only explains why auctions are rare in markets where search
matters, the theory of the variable value environment developed herein also
o¤er insight into auction design for these markets.4
To the best of our knowledge, a variable value environment has never
been introduced or investigated in the economic literature. In fact, the time
dimension central for variable value environment is essentially absent from
the auction literature. Although in many auction models bidders use bid
history for updating their beliefs, this does not introduce time dimension
into the auction environment. Indeed, the multi-period updating is due to a
mechanism selected for the auction, and it is the process of the auction that
in‡uences the bidders values in these models and not the passage of time.
An auction where participants bid for packages of goods in multiple rounds is
another example of an auction where a time line is a part of the mechanism
but not a part of the auction environment (for a recent example of such a
4Even a sale of consumer items via Internet auction houses may have a variable value
component. Consider a consumer who is considering bidding for an object on an auction
that ends in …ve days. Such a consumer may take private actions that in‡uence her private
value of the object. For example, a consumer considering bidding for some item may forego
opportunities to bid for other similar or complimentary items. Possibly, Internet auction
houses such as e-Bay and Amazon incorporated features that allow bidders to buy an
object instantly at a su¢ciently high price (set by the seller) in order to avoid some of the
ine¢ciencies of using second price auction in the variable value environment. Of course,
the use of Buy-It-Now feature in Internet auctions might, perhaps, be explained by factors
other than variable value features of the environment. Still, this seems to be a natural
explanation.
3mechanism, see Milgrom, 2000, Perry and Reny, 1998, etc).
Auction mechanisms with entry costs are related to the variable value
environments: Mathematically, decision to pay for costly entry into an auc-
tion is equivalent to an action that boosts the private value of the agent.
However, there is a number of signi…cant di¤erences. Most importantly, an
entry fee is a feature of the mechanism, rather than of the environment. In
contrast, ability of agents to take actions in‡uencing the value of the object is
a feature of the environment. Entry costs are investigated in various contexts
by Milgrom (1981), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Levin and Smith (1994),
Fullerton and McAfee (1999), and Lixin (2000).
The present work attempts to o¤er insight into auction design for the
variable value environment. We start by proposing a formal model of the
variable value environment with three periods. In the …rst period, each party
receives a private signal s about its private value for the object. In the second
period, a party can take a private, unobservable action at cost c (cost) that
increases the value of the object by b (bene…t) (of course, only the case
where b>cis of interest). In the third period, bidders receive independent
exogenous shocks v to their private values of the object. For ith bidder,
the …nal reservation price for the object is the sum of signals (si and vi)
regarding the value obtained in the …rst and third periods plus the bene…t b
from taking an action if the bidder took the action (si + vi + b).O t h e r w i s e ,
the private value of the object is the sum of signals regarding the value
obtained in the …rst and third periods (si + vi). The identity of the bidder
with the highest value can only be established after the third period signals
vi are observed. Thus, an e¢cient allocation mechanism requires that the
ownership of the object is assigned after the third period. It is easy to see
that conducting a second price auction after the third period is not e¢cient
(in a world where …rst period signals are privately observed), since it forces
agents to take decisions regarding second period actions in ignorance of the
4expected private values of other agents. The following example illustrates
this simple but essential point.
Example. Let the number of participants be N =2 ; assume that si are
privately observed signals independently drawn from the uniform distribution
on [0;1]. For simplicity, assume that there is no third period signal, vi ´ 0:5
In a symmetric equilibrium with no revelation of the …rst-period signals, each
agent acts if her probability of winning conditional on her own type is higher
than c
b: That is, agent i acts if si ¸ s¤ = c
b: If s¤ = 3
4, then with probability 1
16
both agents act (which is ine¢cient), and with probability 9
16 no agent acts
(which is ine¢cient as well). Therefore, on average there are too few actions
(1
2 instead of 1). If s¤ = 1
4, the situation is reverse: with probability 9
16 both
agents act, and with probability 1
16 no agent acts. On average, there are too
many actions (3
2 instead of 1). This is hardly surprising: without signaling,
there are too few actions, when actions are relatively costly (c
b = 3
4), and
there are too many actions, when actions are relatively cheap (c
b = 1
4).
This paper focuses on a model with three periods and private values, since
it is su¢ciently rich to yield interesting insights into auctions in the variable
value environment. A model of variable value environment extending for
a large number of periods can also be considered. Our model can also be
extended by introducing a common value component to third-period signals.
We consider a problem of designing an e¢cient mechanism for allocating
the object in the environment where signals about bidder’s private values
(si,a n dºi) are private signals. First, the concept of allocation needs to
5Note that in the special case of all vi’s equal to zero; an e¢cient allocation rule can
be implemented by assigning the ownership of the object by conducting a Vickrey auction
at the end of the …rst period after si’s are privately learned. Also note that for any non-
degenerate distribution of third-period signals, assigning the ownership of the object at
the end of the …rst period is no longer e¢cient. Of course, the ine¢ciency of allocating
the object at the end of the third period demonstrated by the example does not go away
when vi’s are not equal to zero.
5be generalized for the variable value environment. For the variable value
environment an allocation is de…ned as the identity of the bidder who receives
the object and the list of private actions taken by bidders. The objective of
the social planner is to implement an e¢cient allocation, i.e. to maximize the
social surplus, which equals to the expected sum of all bidder’s surpluses net
of the cost of actions. After the social planner observes the …rst-period signals
si obtained by bidders, she has to decide which bidders should act in the
second period and which should abstain from actions. Since the exogenous
s h o c ko ft h et h i r dp e r i o di sn o tk n o w ni nt h es e c o n dp e r i o d( w h e nd e c i s i o n s
to take actions are made), it may be e¢cient to have more than one bidder
taking an action or to have no bidders at all taking actions.6 Theorem 1
establishes that if the social planner orders an agent with the …rst-period
value si to act, then she also orders all agents with value greater than si to
act.
Of course, an all-knowing and well-intentioned social planner is rarely
available in the real world. What happens if there is no social planner but
all the information is common knowledge, i.e. signals obtained by a bidder
about her private value are observed by all players? Theorem 2 establishes
that the e¢cient allocation can be achieved in a decentralized case. (This is
the same …rst-best allocation that can be achieved by the social planner.)
The above mentioned results rely on bidders’ private values being com-
mon knowledge. A more realistic case, where bidders privately observe their
valuations, is of primary interest. Can an e¢cient allocation be achieved in
that case? It is straightforward that an e¢cient allocation can not be at-
tained without revelation of bidders’ private signals (si) prior to the second
period. If the object is allocated to the bidder with the highest value follow-
6Indeed, for a given distribution of the third-period exogenous shock, it becomes ine¢-
cient for anybody to undertake an action as the cost of action approaches the bene…t. On
the other extreme, if the cost of action approaches zero it becomes e¢cient for more than
one agent to undertake an action.
6ing the third period (using, say, a second price sealed bid auction) adding a
cheap talk stage following the …rst period will not result in any information
revelation and thus would lead to an ine¢cient outcome (allocation).7 In the
cheap talk stage each bidder would claim to be “the high type” because the
higher is the perceived type of a bidder the less likely are the other bidders
to undertake actions and thus the lower are the subsequent bids for the ob-
ject by other players. Theorem 3 and Theorem 5 show that there exists an
e¢cient mechanism, where private information is revealed in the …rst round
and the object is assigned in the second round. The …rst round (also called
signaling round) takes place after private signals si are received by agents.
In the …rst round bidders reveal their private signals si by making signaling
payments (we show that the higher is the private signal si; the higher is the
agent’s willingness to pay for signaling to other agents that the value of her
private signal si is high). The second round (also called the …nal auction)
consists of a second price sealed bid auction conducted after signals vi are
received.
As long as private signals si are truthfully revealed in the …rst round, the
subgame corresponding to the second round is identical to the complete in-
formation game. Theorem 3 establishes that the mechanism described above
has an e¢cient separating equilibrium. Unfortunately, this mechanism also
has an ine¢cient pooling equilibrium. To rule out the pooling equilibrium,
we propose a class of mechanisms that force players to coordinate on the sep-
arating equilibrium. We refer to mechanisms from this class as “"¡e¢cient
mechanisms.” We prove that one can always choose an "¡e¢cient mech-
anism which yields an e¢cient allocation with probability arbitrarily close
7The condition that the object is allocated to the bidder with the highest value following
the third period is a necessary, but not su¢cient condition for e¢cient allocation in the
variable value environment. This is because e¢ciency of an allocation depends on the set
of players that take actions in the second period. As we mentioned before, the winning
bidder might have forgone investment opportunities enhancing the value of the object.
7to one. An "¡e¢cient mechanism consists of two rounds. The …rst round
takes place after private signals si are received by agents: a non-transferable
discount for amount " is sold via a sealed bid all pay auction. After the all
pay auction all bids are made public. The " discount can only be used in the
second round auction. In the second round the object is sold using a Vickrey
auction (if the winner of the Vickrey auction is a holder of the " discount, she
pays the second highest bid minus "). Note that for " =0this mechanism
is identical to the e¢cient signaling mechanism described above. Theorem
6 shows that an arbitrarily small positive " forces agents to coordinate on
a separating equilibrium that yields an e¢cient allocation with probability
converging to one as " converges to zero.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
the formal model of the variable value environment. In Section 3, an ef-
…cient mechanism that has a fully separating Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is
described. Section 4 introduces the "¡e¢cient mechanism and establishes
that it has a unique robust equilibrium. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix
contains mathematical details and proofs.
2T h e E n v i r o n m e n t
The variable value environment is an environment, where bidders’ expected
value of the object changes stochastically over time. One can think of the
object as an asset that will become available for use at a known future date
or a good or service that has to be consumed at a particular time. Prior to
the date when the object becomes available, bidders’ expected values of the
object ‡uctuate due to exogenous shocks and private actions. This paper
focuses on a three period model of the variable value environment: it is the
simplest possible model that exhibits essential features of the variable value
environment and o¤ers insights into auction design in such an environment.
8There are N identical agents. In the …rst and the third periods, agents
receive independent signals about their private values of the object. In the
second period, each agent has an opportunity to take a costly action that
increase her private value of the object.
Timing
Period 1. Each agent receives a signal si ¸ 0 about her private values,
drawn independently from the same atomless distribution: We shall consider
cases where the …rst-period signal is common knowledge, as well as the case
where the …rst-period signal is a private signal.
Period 2. Each agent i has an opportunity to take an unobservable action,
i.e. choose ai 2f 0;1g; which increases the agent’s private value by bai and
costs cai ¸ 0 (obviously, only the case of b>cis of interest). When ai =1
we say that the agent i undertakes the action or simply ‘acts’; if ai =0we
say the agent i abstains from acting or skips the action.8
Period 3. Agents receive independent signals vi ¸ 0 about their private
values. The third period signals are independent from signals observed in
the …rst period and actions taken in the second period. v0
is are independently
drawn from an atomless distribution.
Agent’s i private value of the object equals qi = si + bai + vi; the sum
of her …rst and third period signals plus the bene…t from taking an action.
Thus the utility of the agent is given by:
ui =
½
si +( b ¡ c)ai + vi ¡ paidi; if the agent i wins the object
¡cai ¡ paidi; otherwise,
where paidi denotes the total amount of payments made by the agent i within
a mechanism (i.e. not including c). Note that paidi need not be equal to
zero for loosing bidders.
We will explore possibilities of e¢ciently allocating the object within the
model of the variable value environment formulated above. First, we need to
8Our results also hold for the case of observable actions.
9extend the concepts of allocation, e¢ciency, and social surplus to the variable
value environment.
De…nition 1 Social surplus is the value of the object to the agent that gets
the object minus the cost of actions taken by all agents: S = sj + baj + vj ¡
PN
i=1 cai = qj ¡ c
PN
i=1 ai; where j is the identity of the agent that receives
the object.
De…nition 2 Allocation is a vector consisting of the list of agents who took
actions and the identity of the agent who received the object.9
An allocation needs to specify the identities of agents who took actions
because actions a¤ect the social surplus.
De…nition 3 An equilibrium strategy pro…le of a mechanism (e.g., an auc-
tion) is referred to as an allocation rule. If a mechanism has multiple equi-
libria, each equilibrium strategy pro…le de…nes an allocation rule.
Note that an allocation rule induces a probability distribution over values
of social surplus induced by a mechanism or by a social choice rule adopted
by the social planner. Allocation rules can be ranked in terms of e¢ciency
by comparing corresponding expected values of the social surplus.
De…nition 4 An allocation rule is e¢cient (…rst-best), if it yields the same
expected social surplus as the maximum expected social surplus that can be
achieved by the social planner, who observes all signals received by agents,
orders agents to take or not to take actions, and, …nally, assigns the object.
For convenience of the reader, below we list notation used in the paper.
9We can think of allocation as a vector of N +1components. The …rst N component
a r eg i v e nb yt h ev e c t o ra of actions taken by all agents and the last component is the
identity of the agent receiving the object.
10Notation
s =( s1;:::;sN)=( si;s¡i) agents’ …rst-period signals
v =( v1;:::;vN) agents’ third-period signals
a =( a1;:::;aN) action pro…le, ai 2f 0;1g
b bene…t from action (applies if the object is won)
c cost of action
S social surplus
Gi change in expected social surplus due to i’s action
gi change in agent’s i expected pay-o¤ due to action
a(m) actions pro…le: agents with m highest si’s act
b s =( b s1;:::;b sN)=( b si;b s¡i) agents’ reports of their …rst-period signals
hi;H i payments making agent’s i report credible
¼i(si;^ si;s¡i) agent’s i pay-o¤ net of signaling costs
X;Y;Z generic random variables (in the Appendix)
3 E¢cient Mechanism in The Variable Value
Environment
In this section, we study mechanism design in the variable value environment.
We start with considering a benchmark case of the e¢cient mechanism for
allocating the object that can be achieved by a social planner who knows all
the private information available to bidders. Then we consider a mechanism
that allocates the object e¢ciently in the incomplete information case.
3.1 The Social Planner’s Problem
Let us start by characterizing the solution to the social planner problem.
After observing the …rst period signals, the social planner decides which
agents should act in the second period. Formally, there is a mapping of a
vector of the …rst period signals into a vector of the second period actions
11a¤ = a¤(s).10 At the end of the third period the social planner assigns the
object, thus mapping a triplet of vectors (s;a;v) into a number between 1
and N. The …nal assignment of the object is easily characterized. The social
surplus maximization calls for assigning the object to the agent with the
highest ex-post private value: if the e¢cient allocation assigns the object to
the agent j; then for any i 6= j; we have sj + baj + vj ¸ si + bai + vi.T h u s ,
assigning the object before agents have learned their …nal values of the object
is likely to be ine¢cient. Obviously, in the variable value environment, giving
the object to the agent with the highest ex-post value is necessary, but not
su¢cient for e¢ciency. It remains to characterize the function a¤(s) that
describes the second period actions. We would like to …nd a vector of actions
a¤(s) that maximizes the expected social surplus, given s: By de…nition, the
social surplus is given by:
Ev[Sjs;a]=Ev max
i




So, the social planner’s problem might be written as follows:
max











Before proceeding to general results, let us illustrate this problem with a
simple example.
Example. This is essentially a continuation of the Example from the intro-
duction. Suppose that N ¸ 2: If there is no third-period uncertainty (vi ´ 0),
then the social planner chooses exactly one agent to act – the one with the
highest …rst-period signal. On the other extreme, if there is no …rst-period
signal (si ´ 0); and the cost of action is relatively cheap, c
b < 1
N; then the
social planner would assign all agents to act.
10In the most general case, the social planner may assign mixed strategies to the agents.
We show later that almost surely, the social planner problem has a unique pure strategy
solution. Consequently, we focus on pure strategies of the social planner.
12It is useful to introduce a function Gi(s;a¡i) representing the di¤erence
in the expected social surplus that results from the agent i acting and not
acting (keeping the actions of other agents unchanged):
Gi(s;a¡i)=Ev[Sjs;a¡i;a i =1 ]¡ Ev[Sjs;a¡i;a i =0 ] : (2)
Since the social planner maximizes social surplus, the expected surplus in
the above formula should be computed under assumption that after the third
period the social planner allocates the object to the agent with the highest
value. The social planner faces the following trade-o¤: each additional agen-
t’s act increases the expected private value of the agents who receives the
object, but is associated with the cost of c: Let a(m)=a(m;s) denote the
vector of actions, where the agents with the highest m …rst-period signals
act, while the other N ¡ m agents skip action.
Theorem 1 For a given vector of the …rst-period private signals s,t h e r e
exists a threshold r¤ = r¤(s) such that the social planner assigns agents with
the highest r¤ …rst-period signals to act.11
Proof. To prove Theorem 1, we need to establish the following Lemma.







i for all i 6= j;k,a n dl e taj =1 , ak =0 ;a 0
j =0 ; and a0
k =1 : If sj ¸ sk; then
the expected social surplus from a is greater than that from a0.
A proof of the Lemma is in the Appendix.
The above Lemma shows that a vector of actions maximizing the expected
social surplus must be of the form a(m) for some m; 0 · m · N: Since there
is a …nite number of possible m’s, there exists some r¤ such that a(r¤) is the
11r¤ is determined almost uniquely: The event that the expected social surplus is max-
imized by more than one action vector of the form a(r¤) and a(r¤¤) where r¤ 6= r¤¤ has
zero probability.
13global maximizer of the expected social surplus. This completes the proof of
Theorem 1.¥
De…nition of Gi(s;a¡i) implies that an action vector maximizing the social
surplus must satisfy Gi(s;a¡i) ¸ 0 when ai =1and Gi(s;a¡i) · 0 when
ai =0 .
3.2 Complete Information
Now we turn to a world without an all-knowing and well-intentioned social
planner. We consider the case, where agents act non-cooperatively, given
that the …rst-period signals are common knowledge. This is an essential step
towards mechanism design for the incomplete information case.
One might expect that in the decentralized case too many or too few
players may take actions, since they may not fully internalize the e¤ect of
their private actions on other players. We show that an e¢cient allocation
can be achieved in a decentralized case, when bidders know each other’s …rst-
period signals. Theorem 2 states that in this case there exists an equilibrium
outcome of a second price auction conducted at the end of the third period
that yields an e¢cient allocation. It is the same allocation as the …rst best
obtained by the social planner.
Theorem 2 If …rst-period signals s are public knowledge, there exists a so-
cially e¢cient Subgame Perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of a second price
sealed bid auction conducted at the end of the third period. In this equilib-
rium, agents take unobservable actions as if they were assigned by the social
planner resulting in the allocation rule characterized in Theorem 1.
The basic intuition is as follows: the expected increase in an agent’s
utility from taking an action is exactly equal to the change in the expected
14social surplus due to her action.12 Then the fact that a(r¤) is the social
planner’s optimal choice ensures that a(r¤) is an equilibrium vector of actions
in the non-cooperative game.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . We introduce a function gi(s;a¡i) de…ned as the
change in the expected utility of the agent i as a result of taking an action
instead of skipping it, and prove the following assertion.
Lemma 2 gi(s;a¡i)=Gi(s;a¡i).
The proof of Lemma 2 is in the Appendix.
Now observe that if a is a solution to the social planner’s problem, then
Gi(s;a¡i) ¸ 0 when ai =1and Gi(s;a¡i) · 0 when ai =0 : Indeed, if
Gi(s;a¡i) < 0 when ai =1 ,t h ea g e n t ’ si switch from acting to non-acting
would strictly increase the expected social surplus, contradicting the choice
of a: Similarly, Gi(s;a¡i) · 0 when ai =0 : Then Lemma 2 asserts that for
the change in private bene…ts we have gi(s;a¡i) ¸ 0 for agents that act,
and gi(s;a¡i) · 0 for others: Thus, no agent has incentives to deviate, and
Theorem 2 is proven.¥
Here and in the rest of the paper the term ‘equilibrium’ is reserved for
a subgame-perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. The e¢cient equilibrium de-
scribed in Theorem 2 seems to be a natural focal point. However, the game
has a coordination component: there are other Bayesian equilibria that are
not e¢cient. For example, if there are only two players, there might be two
equilibria: one with the highest-ranked agent acting and the other abstaining,
and another one with the second-ranked agent acting and the highest-ranked
abstaining.
12The logic behind the result is similar to the one that insures e¢cient entry in McAfee
and McMillan (1987) and Levin and Smith (1994).
153.3 Incomplete Information: Ex-post E¢cient Signal-
ing Equilibrium
Now we are ready to investigate the incomplete information case. Here we
consider a three-period model of the variable value environment similar to
the one considered in the preceding section: the only di¤erence is that here
bidders’ signals regarding their private values (s and v)a r eo b s e r v e dp r i -
vately. Now a mechanism consisting of an auction conducted after the third
period no longer leads to an e¢cient allocation, since under such mechanism
agents take second-period actions without knowledge of the private signals
obtained by other players.13 Obviously, an e¢cient allocation rule can not
always assign the …nal ownership of the object prior the end of the third
period.
Is it possible to allocate an object e¢ciently in the variable value envi-
ronment of incomplete information? This question is answered a¢rmatively
by Theorem 3. We explicitly construct an e¢cient allocation mechanism.
The mechanism consists of two rounds: The private information is revealed
by signaling in the …rst round that takes place after the …rst-period-private-
signals are observed; the ownership of the object is assigned in the second
round that takes place after the third period private signals are observed by
bidders.
13For the sake of completeness, one can consider the no-signalling case, where an auction
is conducted after the third period and no signaling takes place before the second period.
(Note that cheap talk communication following the …rst stage is not credible because
everybody has an incentive to exaggerate his signal.) To describe the symmetric equilibria
of this game, one can show that there exists a unique constant s¤ such that any agent
acts if her …rst-stage value si is higher or equal to s¤; and abstains from acting otherwise.
In the equilibrium, the expected number of actions is N (1¡ Fs(s¤)): So, in some cases,
there are too few actions, while in others there are too many. This is a generalization of
the Example from the Introduction. Also, there are a number of asymmetric equilibria.
Of course, an asymmetric equilibrium can not lead to an e¢cient allocation rule.
16Rounds of the Signaling Mechanism:
1.a Part a of the …rst round takes place at the end of the …rst period (after
the private signals s have been received by agents). In part a of the …rst
round, all agents make simultaneous announcements b si about their private
values si (the announcements are publicly observed).
1.b Part b of the …rst round immediately follows part a. Each agent volun-
tarily selects a payment amount, hi ¸ 0; that depends on the announcements
of other agents, as well as her own announcement. (Payments hi(b s) are nec-
essary to make announcements credible.)
2. The second round takes place at the end of the third period, after agents
observe their private signals vi: In the second round, the ownership of the
object is assigned using a second-price sealed-bid auction.
Theorem 3 There exists a subgame perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of
the Signaling Mechanism that yields an e¢cient allocation rule.
Proofs of Theorem 3 and all subsequent results are relegated to the Ap-
pendix. Here, let us discuss the logic behind the result. First, note that
if the …rst period signals are revealed truthfully, the remaining subgame is
identical to the game where …rst-period signals s are common knowledge.
Theorem 2 established that an e¢cient allocation is an equilibrium of that
game. Consequently, in order to establish existence of an e¢cient allocation
mechanism it su¢ces to show that for some signaling payment schedule hi(b s);
truthful reporting is an equilibrium, when agents anticipate that the equilib-
r i u mc h a r a c t e r i z e di nT h e o r e m2w i l lb ep l a y e di nt h er e m a i n i n gs u b g a m e .
The intuition behind the possibility of truthful revelation is as follows. The
higher is the …rst period signal si received by an agent i; the higher is that
agent’s relative willingness to pay in order to signal that her value of si is
high. Agents are willing to pay in order to reveal their …rst period signals,
because this information discourages other agents from taking actions, thus
17increasing the probability of winning for the agent i and decreasing the ex-
pected price that she will pay for the object (in the subsequent second price
auction) conditional on winning. The expected price decrease a¤ects agents
with di¤erent private values di¤erently. For instance, someone with a very
low …rst-period signal is unlikely to win the object, thus her willingness to
pay for sending a signal that depress the price of the object is lower than
that of an agent with a relatively high …rst-period signal about her private
value. This observation, which is critical to the existence of a separating
signaling equilibrium, is formalized in Lemma 3. This Lemma establishes
an appropriate analog of the single-crossing property for the pay-o¤s in the
subgame.14
Lemma 3 Let E¼i(si; ^ si;s¡i) be bidder i’s expected pay-o¤ gross of hi(b s),
when her true private signal is si; while other agents believe that the vector
of …rst-period private signals is (^ si;s¡i).F o ra n y s¡i and any ^ s0









i;^ si;s¡i) ¸ E¼i(si; ^ s
0
i;s¡i) ¡ E¼i(si; ^ si;s¡i): (3)
In the above Lemma, E¼i(si; ^ si;s¡i) is the expected pay-o¤ of agent i
in the mechanism described in Section 3.2, when the …rst period private
signals are given by (si;s¡i) and player i plays the best response to the action
pro…le of players ¡i given by a(r¤(^ si;s¡i)): (The action pro…le a(r¤(^ si;s¡i))
is characterized in Theorem 1.) Essentially, E¼i(si; ^ si;s¡i) is the pay-o¤
received by agent i in the subgame computed under an assumption that
all …rst round announcements are believed to be truthful, and that agent i
reported ^ si; while her true private value is si.
Lemma 3 states that the same change in announcement (from ^ si to ^ s0
i)
brings more in expected surplus to the agent with relatively high true signal,
14Note that the notion of single-crossing used in this paper is di¤erent from (is stronger
than) that of Athey (1999) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
18s0
i.N o t et h a tE¼i(si; ^ si;s¡i) is not the same as the expected utility of agent
i; because it does not include the payments hi made in the …rst round of the
mechanism. The agent’s utility is given by E¼i(si; ^ si;s¡i)¡hi. Thus, truth-
ful reporting si is consistent with an equilibrium, if there exists a payment
schedule h(^ si;s¡i) such that incentive compatibility and individual rational-
ity constraints are satis…ed. Namely, for any agent i and all (si; ^ si;s¡i) the
payments should satisfy the following conditions:
E¼i(si;s i;s¡i) ¡ h(si;s¡i) > E¼i(si; ^ si;s¡i) ¡ h(^ si;s¡i) (IC)
E¼i(si;s i;s¡i) ¡ h(si;s¡i) > E¼i(si; ^ si =0 ;s¡i) (IR)
Note that …nding h(^ si;s¡i) that satis…es the above constraints is su¢cient
for proving the claim of Theorem 3. Such payment schedule hi(^ si;s¡i) is
characterized in Theorem 4. Before proceeding to Theorem 4, we need to
introduce one more de…nition.
Consider the e¢cient allocation rule characterized in Theorem 1. It im-
plies that for any vector of the …rst period private signals s¡i; there exists a
sequence 0=¹ si(k¤
i) · ¹ si(k¤
i ¡ 1) · ::: · ¹ si(1) · ¹ si(0) < 1; where ¹ si(k) is
de…ned to be the minimal type of i such that exactly k highest-ranked agents
(di¤erent from the agent i herself) act in the subgame equilibrium described
in Theorem 2. Let k¤
i = k¤
i(0;s¡i) be the number of agents acting, when i
has the lowest possible type (zero). Within each segment described above,
an agent’s i report is irrelevant to the other agents’ decisions on whether or
not to act.
As above, let a(m) denote the vector of actions, where the agents with
the highest m …rst-period signals act, while the other N ¡ m agents skip
action. Note that a(m) is a function of the vector of …rst-period signals s:
Theorem 4 The following signaling payments are consistent with an e¢-
cient equilibrium of the Signaling Mechanism. For any i;
hi(^ si;^ s¡i)=0 ; whenever ¹ si(k
¤
i) · ^ si · ¹ si(k
¤
i ¡ 1); (4)
19hi(^ si;^ s¡i)=hi(¹ si(k);^ s¡i)+E¼i(¹ si(k);a(k)) ¡ E¼i(¹ si(k);a(k +1 ) ) ;
whenever ¹ si(k) < ^ si · ¹ si(k ¡ 1);k<k ¤
i:
Theorem 4 shows that for any agent i; the payment schedule satis…es
incentive compatibility and individual rationality (IC and IR, respectively)
constraints. Then, if agents in the set ¡i report their type truthfully, ^ s¡i =
s¡i; the payment scheme for the agent i given by (4) induces her to report
her type truthfully, ^ si = si: The proof of Theorem 3 is based on combining
Theorem 2 and Theorem 4.
In the equilibrium described above, each agent reports her type truthfully
regardless of the other agents’ types given that these types are reported
truthfully.15 This is a kind of an ex-post equilibrium (Perry and Reny,1999),
where no agent regrets her announcement after learning the other agents’
types; thus, this mechanism is similar in spirit to the well-known Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism (e.g., Vickrey, 1961, Krishna and Perry, 1998).
However, unlike the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, this is a two-round
mechanism, where payments made in the signaling round of the mechanism
have no direct impact on allocating of the object — these payments in‡uence
the allocation of object indirectly by shaping beliefs about …rst period signals.
3.4 Ex-ante Signaling Equilibrium
The mechanism described above provides an ex-post e¢cient ex-post equi-
librium. In such an equilibrium, agents’ payments may depend on the other
agents’ announcements. Below we show that the Signaling Mechanism de-
scribed in the previous section also has an ex-ante e¢cient separating equilib-
rium. In this equilibrium, agents make no announcements (or make uninfor-
mative announcements) in the cheap talk stage of the Signaling Mechanism.
15As usual, the revelation principle (Myerson, 1979) allows us to assume that agents
report their types directly, rather than conveying information via a special set of signals.
20In the stage 1b they simultaneously make publicly observable payments Hi
(obviously, an agent decides on the payment size without knowing the private
signals of other agents). We will show that there exists a fully separating
equilibrium where there is a unique payment corresponding to each private
signal si. Consequently, agents no longer need to make announcements, be-
cause the announcements of their private signals are “contained” in the size
of payments Hi that they make.
Theorem 5 There exists an e¢cient equilibrium in the Signaling Mecha-
nism where all agent simultaneously make signaling payments H(si) that
depend only on agent’s private information si. Equilibrium signaling pay-
ments are given by Hi(^ si)=Es¡ihi(^ si;s¡i); where hi(^ si;s¡i) are equilibrium
payments de…ned in Lemma 4.
Let us discuss the intuition behind the proof of Theorem 5. According to
Theorem 2 an e¢cient allocation can be obtained if the …rst period signals
si are common knowledge. It remains to show that the signaling mechanism
proposed above is incentive compatible when an e¢cient equilibrium is chosen
in the subgame following the signaling stage. More formally we need to show




Es¡i;v¼i(si;^ si;s¡i) ¡ Hi(^ si)
ª
(note that here expectation is taken with respect to s¡i and v): This re-
sult is a straightforward corollary to the existence of an ex-post equilibrium
established in Lemma 4. Existence of this ‘ex-ante’ separating equilibrium
essentially follows from the fact that if the agent’s i truth-telling is a best
reply to any vector s¡i of other agents’ signals, than it is a best reply on the
average as well.
Although existence of ex-ante equilibrium follows from existence of an
ex-post equilibrium, existence of an ex-ante equilibrium is a useful result. It
21shades some light on the maneuvering that bidders often make prior to an
auction: for example, …rms preparing to participate in a large-scale privatiza-
tion auction or competing for a procurement contract might engage in costly
signaling in order to discourage potential rivals. For example, let us consider
the history of bidding for Los Angeles licence in 1995 broadband auction
for mobile-phone licenses.16 One bidder, Paci…c Telephone, possibly started
with a higher private value than other bidders due to experience in California
market and possible synergies between its wireline and wireless businesses.
There were a number of important decisions (actions) that each bidder had
to make before the auction for Los Angeles license, these included forming
alliances, making investments and formulating strategies for other markets.
It appears that Paci…c Telephone signaled to other bidders (and would-be
bidders) that it anticipates winning California. Paci…c Telephone made pub-
lic statements like ‘If somebody takes California away from us, they’ll never
make any money’.17 To make these statement credible, Paci…c Telephone
made investments that were of little value without winning Los Angeles li-
cense18. As a result, some potential bidders (including the industry giants
such as Bell Atlantic, GTE, and MCI) were discouraged from participating
in the auction. (Thus failing to undertake an action, in our interpretation).
In fact, GTE and Bell Atlantic took actions that made them ineligible for the
auction. As a result, revenues were quite low compared to initial estimates.19
16We thank Paul Milgrom for suggesting this example of the variable value environment.
17Wall Street Journal, October 31, 1994.
18Some of the investments made by Paci…c Telephone might be interpreted as actions
and others as signals. Essentially, running a PR campaign aimed at signaling that Paci…c
Telephone is determined to win Los Angeles license can be interpreted as signaling. In
contrast, making unobservable arrangements made to expedite creation of the wireless
service in Southern California can be interpreted as an action.
19Granted, this is not the only possible interpretation of the 1995 auction for Los Angeles
licence. Klemperer (2000) considers the history of this auction and suggests that the
winner’s curse played an important role because the winner’s curse is particularly powerful
in auctions where one bidder has an advantage. For a theoretical argument that uses this
22Applying the logic of our model highlights the importance of signaling that
discourages competitors from taking actions that increase the value of the
prize for them.
In the above example the signaling costs have not been captured by the
auctioneer. In general, there is no reason why bidders would opt to signal
their types by writing checks to the auctioneer and not by burning money
in some other way. Also, the game considered above has an ine¢cient pool-
ing equilibrium along with an e¢cient separating one. Thus, there is no
guarantee that an e¢cient equilibrium is selected. In the following section
we introduce "¡e¢cient mechanism, which is similar to the ex-ante equilib-
rium considered here, but free of its main disadvantages. First, "¡e¢cient
mechanism insures coordination on the e¢cient equilibrium in the subgame.
Second, it allows seller to capture the signaling costs of bidders. The sacri…ce
that must be made in order to gain robustness and capture signaling costs is
an arbitrarily small loss in e¢ciency.
4R o b u s t "-E¢cient Auction Mechanism
The e¢cient mechanism described in the previous section can be viewed as
a two-stage auction. The signaling stage, where agents simultaneously make
payments that reveal their types, can be replaced with a sealed bid all pay
auction where the object being sold is worth nothing (zero). Theorem 5
established existence of an e¢cient Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this two
stage auction. Unfortunately, this is not a unique equilibrium: a pooling
equilibrium, where everybody bids zero in the signaling stage, is a natural
logic, see also Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999). The outcome of that auction was
probably determined by a constellation of a large number of factors. Revenue in the
auction for Los Angeles licence were low in comparison with spectrum auction in Chicago;
however, it is not clear if asymmetry among bidders and the winner curse were more severe
in California.
23focal point. Nevertheless, introducing an arbitrarily small ine¢ciency into
the auction design can force bidders to coordinate on an e¢cient separating
equilibrium. We will refer to such a mechanism as an "¡e¢cient mecha-
nism. We start with describing an "¡e¢cient mechanism and then proceed
to establish e¢ciency properties of this mechanism in Theorem 6.
Rounds of "¡E¢cient Auction
1. The …rst (signaling) round takes place at the end of the …rst period (after
the private signals s have been received by agents, but before agents take
actions). In this round one coupon is sold via all pay sealed bid auction.20
All bids are announced at the end of the round. The coupon sold in the
signaling round entitles its owner to a discount of size " for the price in the
…nal auction (the discount coupon is not-transferable, only the winner of the
…nal auction can bene…t from having the coupon).
2. The second round (…nal) auction takes place at the end of the third period,
after agents observe private signals v: In the second round the ownership of
the object is assigned using a second price sealed bid auction. (If the highest
bidder in the …nal round is the owner of the "¡coupon, then she pays the
second highest bid minus ".)
There are two rounds and three decision nodes in an "-e¢cient mecha-
nism. At the …rst decision node, agents make bids in an all-pay auction, i.e.
the i’s actions space is fHijHi ¸ 0g. The information set of agent i at the …rst
decision node is given by si: The …rst round strategy is described by the prob-
ability distribution ½i(¢;si) over the set of pure strategies fHijHi ¸ 0g.A tt h e
second decision node, agents make a decision to act or not to act. The infor-
mation set of agent i at the second decision node is given by (si;H i;H¡i;w),
20In an all pay sealed bid auction every agent submits a sealed bid. All agents have to
pay the amount of their bids regardless of whether or not they won the object. The agent
with the highest bid receives the object. (In case of a tie the winner is randomly chosen
from the set of highest bidders.) Fullerton and McAfee (1999) use an all-pay auction in
their ’contestant selection auction’.
24where w is an N-dimensional vector with wk =1if the agent k won the
coupon in the all pay auction, and wk =0otherwise. (There is a unique
vector w consistent with vector of payments H; unless there is a tie). The
probability that agent i acts (ai =1 )is denoted by pi(si;H i;H¡i;w): At the
third decision node, agents submit bids in the second price sealed-bid auc-
tion. At this moment, the information sets are (si;H i;H¡i;w;a i;v i).I t i s
well known that in an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies of a private
value Vickrey auction bidders bid their true values. Thus, equilibrium bids
are given by si+ vi + aib + "wi.
Clearly, an "-e¢cient mechanism has multiple equilibria. Some of these
equilibria are highly implausible. In order to rule out such equilibria we
introduce a restriction on strategies in the spirit of ‘intuitive’ criteria such as
D1 of Cho and Kreps (1987) or stability of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
De…nition 5 A strategy of an agent j is monotonic, if two vectors H¡j and
H0
¡j di¤er only in component i so that Hi >H 0
i; then pj(sj;H j;H¡j;w) ·
pj(sj;H j;H0
¡j;w0).
In words, a well-behaved strategy of an agent j assumes that for any
history, the probability that the agent j t a k e sa na c t i o ni sn o n - i n c r e a s i n gi n
the size of the payment that some agent i; i 6= j makes in the signaling stage.
As we will see, the requirement that the strategies are well-behaved rules
out the ‘bizarre’ equilibrium, where all agents bid zero in the signaling stage
and an agent who bids a positive amount is perceived to be of the lowest type.
Basically, there are two reasons why an equilibrium strategy may not be well-
behaved: First, perverse beliefs may sustain an equilibrium in strategies that
are not well-behaved. An example of such ‘unnatural’ beliefs is as follows:
The more an agent bids for a discount coupon, the lower is her perceived si.
Obviously, this is counter-intuitive: the higher is an agent’s si; t h em o r es h e
values the discount coupon. The second possibility stems from coordination
aspect of the game. If bids in the signaling stage are used as coordination
25devices for selecting a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the remaining subgame,
an equilibrium resulting from these beliefs may include strategies that are
not well-behaved.
De…nition 6 Robust equilibrium of an "¡e¢cient mechanism is any sym-
metric subgame-perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in monotonic strategies.
Theorem 6 For an "-e¢cient mechanism, the following is true:
(i) There exists a robust equilibrium.
(ii) The robust equilibrium is unique.
(iii) The probability that the robust equilibrium yields an e¢cient alloca-
tion converges to one as " ! 0:
Let us sketch the intuition behind this result. A pooling equilibrium where
everybody bids zero for the coupon is not robust. Indeed, if everybody bids
zero for the discount, it can be purchased for an arbitrarily small amount.
Thus, the pooling equilibrium is sustainable only if bidders are discouraged
from bidding a positive amount by a belief that a positive bid would encour-
age other bidders to act more aggressively in the action stage. However, this
belief is inconsistent with strategies being monotonic. The same argument
applies to any partially pooling equilibrium. We will show that there are no
equilibria in mixed strategies, because the willingness to pay for the discount
is an increasing function of the bidder’s signal. E¢ciency of a robust equilib-
rium follows from Theorem 5 that establishes that for " =0 ; there exists an
e¢cient symmetric equilibrium. To prove asymptotic e¢ciency of a robust
equilibrium we will show that when " approaches 0; the robust equilibrium
converges to the equilibrium described in Theorem 5.21
Let us consider an example illustrating that the all pay auction part of
the "-e¢cient mechanism is crucial for insuring that any robust equilibrium
is separating and nearly e¢cient.
21Also, if the "-e¢cient mechanism yields an ine¢cient outcome, e¢ciency losses are of
magnitude ":
26Example. Suppose the all-pay auction is replaced with a second-price
sealed-bid auction. When a su¢ciently small discount is auctioned o¤ via a
second price auction, the following ine¢cient pooling equilibrium is robust:
all agents bid " for the discount of size ":
Sketch of a Proof. We need to specify beliefs that support this equi-
librium. If an agent deviates by bidding less than "; she is perceived to have
the lowest possible signal si: Thus, there are no incentives to bid less than ";
provided that " is su¢ciently small. If an agent bids more than "; the beliefs
of other agents about her type are the same as if she bids ": Thus, bidding
more than " is a bad strategy: If there are N agents bidding " each in a
second-price auction, each of them has a 1
N chance of getting the discount.
Note that the winner of the discount “envy” the bidders who did not win the
discount, and thus do not have to pay anything in the signaling stage. By
bidding more than "; an agent insures that she wins the discount and will
have to pay for it, thus, making herself worse o¤. ¥
In contrast, there are no robust pooling equilibrium of the "-e¢cient
mechanism (by Theorem 6). For instance, if all agents bid " for the discount,
bidding slightly more than " is a pro…table deviation.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This section discusses applications and examples as well as directions for
further research. Our model captures essential features of the variable value
environment. The model describes the sale of an object available for use at
some future date (such as a military base scheduled to close in two years).
Suppose several …rms from di¤erent industries are considering buying the
base in order to convert it into a manufacturing facility. In this case, in-
vestments complementary with ownership of the base are modeled as actions
and demand shocks, and unexpected developments in bidder’s business are
27modeled as exogenous shocks. We put forth an e¢cient mechanism for allo-
cating an object in such environment (Theorems 3 and 6). At least in theory,
the "-e¢cient auction proposed herein has several important advantages un-
der this environment. First, it has a unique robust equilibrium. Second,
this equilibrium yields e¢cient allocation with near certainty (see Theorem
6). An "-e¢cient auction seems simple and intuitive enough to have vi-
able practical applications; albeit, no amount of theorizing can guarantee
that it performs well with human decision makers. Thus, comparison of "-
e¢cient auction and other types of auctions may be a high pay-o¤ project
for an experimental economist. Note that "-e¢cient auction is preferable to
a Vickrey auction even if it is not certain whether or not the environment
has a variable value component. Indeed, Vickrey auction is a subgame of
"-e¢cient auction. In general, a fully separating equilibrium collapses, if the
…rst period signals have a large common value component.22 In the extreme
case where no information revelation takes place in the signaling round an
"-e¢cient auction yields a negligibly small loss in e¢ciency relative to one
round Vickrey auction. However, as long as information revelation occurs in
the signaling round of the "-e¢cient auction, the additional information is
likely to improve performance of the Vickrey auction conducted in the second
round relative to a standard Vickrey auction. Note that it is straightforward
to show that "-e¢cient auction is e¢cient in independent private value en-
vironment. Obviously, in an independent private value case using a simpler
e¢cient mechanism is more practical, however, it is reassuring that using "-
e¢cient auction does no harm even if the environment has no variable value
22Note that in a variable value setting each agent would like to convince other bidders
that her signal is high in order to discourage other bidders from taking actions; in contrast,
if …rst period signals have a large common value component agents would like to convince
other bidder’s that their signals are low in order to depress the price in the …nal auction.
Thus, if the common value component is large the information revelation in the signaling
round can be limited or even non-existent.
28features. In short, "-e¢cient auction seem to o¤er substantial bene…ts with
a minimum downside.
The model considered in this paper is su¢ciently rich to o¤er insight into
understanding of the variable value environment. However, many important
examples of the variable environment may be better captured by variations
of our models. Markets where search matters are a particularly signi…cant
examples of the variable value environment. For instance, consider a sale of
house A. Suppose it is scheduled to be sold in thirty days via Vickrey auction.
This is an example of an auction in the variable value environment; the e¢-
ciency of allocation may be improved by adding information revelation stage
some time before the …nal auction. The bidders private values for house A
may change depending on what else they see on the market. An event when
a buyer encounters another house that seems to …t him well can be modeled
as an exogenous shock in bidder’s private value for house A. House B suitable
for one of the buyers may be sold …fteen days before the auction for house A,
the decision of a bidder to buy or not to buy house B may be modeled as a
private action (obviously, if a bidder purchases house B her private value for
house A decreases essentially removing him from the market.)23 Thus, mar-
kets with search are examples of the variable value environment. The theory
23Note that we assume that bidders for house A are not competing for other houses, it is
probably approximately true in large cities. Also note that there are many other exogenous
shocks in markets with search. For instance, consider a new bidder who becomes aware
that house A is on the market; we can model this event as an exogenous shock that boosts
the private value of this bidder (naturally if a bidder is unaware that a house is on the
market, she will not bid for the house, thus not knowing that a house is on the market is
mathematically identical to having a private value of zero.) Similarly, when a house liked
by a particular bidder unexpectedly disappears from the market, the willingness of this
bidder to pay for house A increase. This is again an example of an exogenous shock in
a market with search. The most important private action in the market with search is
a purchase of a substitute good: this typically reduces private value of the bidder to the
extent that she is essentially removed from the market.
29of the variable value environment developed herein explains why sellers in
such an environment are reluctant to use auctions. Indeed, we established
that in the variable value environment (e.g. the housing market) standard
auction mechanisms, such as Vickrey auction or …rst price auction, are ine¢-
cient. The signaling mechanism and "- e ¢ c i e n ta u c t i o np r o p o s e di nt h i sp a p e r
inform our intuition for mechanism design in the variable value environments
ranging from market for capital equipment to the housing market.
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32Appendix
The Appendix consists of two parts. Part A contains technical lemmas
needed to prove main Theorems and necessary de…nitions. Part B contains
proofs of Theorems and Lemmas formulated in the body of the paper.
A Technicalities
Random variables X1;:::;XN are symmetrically distributed if their joint cu-
mulative distribution function F(x1;:::;xN) is symmetric, i.e. for any per-
mutation ¼; F(x1;:::;xN)=F(x¼(1);:::;x¼(N)): Ar a n d o mv a r i a b l eX (…rst-
order) stochastically dominates a random variable Y (denoted X º Y )i f
and only if for cumulative density functions, one has FX(t) · FY(t) for any
t 2 R: An equivalent condition is that Eh(X) ¸ Eh(Y ) for any increasing
function h (e.g., Levy, 1992).
For any number (function) x; let x+ =m a x fx;0g:
Lemma 4 For any numbers x;y; and z;maxfx;yg =( x ¡ y)+ + y:
Proof. Straightforward.¥
Lemma 5 For any random variables X and Y such that X stochastically
dominates Y , and any constant z ¸ 0;
E(X + z)
+ ¡ EX
+ ¸ E(Y + z)
+ ¡ EY
+:
Proof. For any z ¸ 0; the function hz(x)=( x + z)+ ¡ x+ is a bounded
increasing function of x: Therefore, the de…nition of stochastic dominance
yields that Ehz(X) ¸ Ehz(Y ):¥
Lemma 6 For random variables X1;:::;XN; and non-negative constants z1;:::;zN;
maxifXi + zigºmaxifXig:
33Proof. Straightforward.¥
Lemma 7 Let X1;:::;XN be symmetrically distributed random variables, and




Yi º Yk ¡ max
i6=k
Yi:
Proof.L e tZ =m a x i6=j;k Yi. We must show that
Xj + zj ¡ maxfXk + zk;ZgºXk + zk ¡ maxfXj + zj;Zg: (5)
Suppose that zj = zk: In this case, (5) is trivially true, since the righ-hand
side and left-hand side of the equation are symmetric in Xj and Xk and thus
identically distributed:
Xj + zk ¡ maxfXk + zk;ZgºXk + zk ¡ maxfXj + zk;Zg:
Then we observe that
Xj + zj ¡ maxfXk + zk;ZgºXj + zk ¡ maxfXk + zk;Zg;
Xk + zk ¡ maxfXj + zk;ZgºXk + zk ¡ maxfXj + zj;Zg;
since zj ¸ zk: It remains to note that stochastic dominance is transitive (by
de…nition). ¥
Lemma 8 Let X1;:::;XN be symmetrically distributed random variables, and
Yi = Xi+zi;i=1 ;:::;N;where zi are constants: Then for any constant z ¸ 0
and any j;k such that zj ¸ zk;
E max
i6=j
fYj + z;Yig¸E max
i6=k
fYk + z;Yig:
Proof. Let Zi =m a x j6=i Yj: Using the formula maxfx;yg =( x ¡ y)+ + y;
which is true for any numbers x;y (Lemma 4), we obtain
E max
i










fYi + z;Ylg¡E max
l
Yl = E(Yi ¡ Zi + z)
+ ¡ E(Yi ¡ Zi)
+: (6)
To prove the claim of our Lemma, it su¢ces to show that if zj ¸ zk;
E max
l6=j
fYj + z;Ylg¡E max
l
Yl ¸ E max
l6=k
fYk + z;Ylg¡E max
l
Yl:
A b o v e ,i tw a sp r o v e dt h a tt h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
E(Yj ¡ Zj + z)
+ ¡ E(Yj ¡ Zj)
+ ¸ E(Yk ¡ Zk + z)
+ ¡ E(Yk ¡ Zk)
+:
Next, note that Yj ¡ Zj º Yk ¡ Zk by Lemma 7. Now Lemma 5 completes
the proof.¥
Using standard technique, Lemma 8 can be easily generalized as follows.
Theorem 7 Let X1;:::;XN be symmetrically distributed random variables,
and Yi = Xi + zi;i=1 ;:::;N; where constants zi are such that z1 ¸ z2 ¸
::: ¸ zN: Let ¢k = f± =( ±1;:::;±N)j0 · ±i · 1;
P
i ±i =1 g be an (N ¡ 1)-
dimensional simplex. Then for any random variable Z ¸ 0; independent of
Xi;
±





Note that we do not require X1;:::;XN to be independent. Clearly, if
some random variables are independent, they are symmetrically distributed.
However, it would not be su¢cient to assume that X1;:::;XN are identically
distributed. The following simple example illustrates the point.
Example. Let X1;X 2 be identically distributed discrete random variables,
X1;X 2 2f 0;a;2g; where a<1: Joint probabilities are as follows: P(0;0) =
P(0;2) = P(a;0) = P(a;a)=P(2;a)=P(2;2) = 1
6 and P(0;a)=P(a;2) =
35P(2;0) = 0: Then maxfX1 +1 ;X 2gºmaxfX1;X 2 +1 g: If Y1 = X1 and
Y2 = X2 + "; where ">0 is su¢ciently small, the last inequality remains to
be true, contradicting the above Lemma.
Also, we note that for two symmetrically distributed variables, it is not
true that maxfX1 +D;X2g stochastically dominates maxfX1 + D
2 ;X 2 + D
2 g:
Indeed, if there are two independent random variables X1;X 2 2f 0;3g with
P(Xi =0 )=P(Xi =3 )=1
2; then maxfX1+2;X 2g ² maxfX1+1;X 2+1g:
BP r o o f s o f M a i n R e s u l t s
Proof of Lemma 1. Let e a be a vector of actions with e aj = e ak =0and
e ai = ai = a0
i for all i 6= j;k: Apply Lemma 8 to symmetrically distributed
random variables vi and constants si +be ai;i=1 ;:::;N to prove our claim.¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .Let Z =m a x j6=ifsj + baj + vjg); and X = si +vi: By
de…nition,
gi(s;a¡i)=E(X + b ¡ Z)
+ ¡ E(X ¡ Z)
+:
Using the formula maxfx;yg =( x ¡ y)+ + y (Lemma 4), we get
Gi(s;a¡i)=E maxfX + b;Zg¡E maxfX;Zg
= E(X + b ¡ Z)
+ + EZ ¡ (E(X ¡ Z)
+ + EZ)
= E(X + b ¡ Z)
+ ¡ E(X ¡ Z)
+ = gi(s;a¡i);
as claimed.¥
Proof of Lemma 3. First, we claim that for any i; and for any s and ~ s
such that s¡i · ~ s¡i and si =~ si;a ¤
i(~ s) · a¤
i(s): Indeed, let Xi(s)=si + vi






We should only care about situations with a¤
j(si;s¡i)=a¤
j(si;~ s¡i) for all
j 6= i: Indeed, if a switch from 1 to 0 o c c u r r e dw i t ha na g e n tt h a te n d su p
higher than i as a result of increase from s¡i to ~ s¡i; then it is de…nite that
36a¤
i(~ s)=0 ; and thus a¤
i(~ s) · a¤
i(s) for any a¤
i(s): Otherwise (if a change have
o c c u r r e dw i t ha na g e n tr a n k e dl o w e rt h a nt h ea g e n ti), a¤
i(s)=1 .
If ~ s¡i ¸ s¡i and a¤
j(si;s¡i)=a¤
j(si;~ s¡i) for all j 6= i; then
Xi(si;s¡i) ¡ Zi(si;s¡i) º Xi(si;e s¡i) ¡ Zi(si;e s¡i)
by Lemmas 6 and 7. To prove that gi(s) ¸ gi(~ s),w eu s er e c a l lt h a t
gi(s)=E (Xi(s)+b ¡ Zi(s))
+ ¡ E (Xi(s) ¡ Zi(s))
+ ;
and then apply Lemma 5 to prove the claim. By de…nition gi(s) ¸ gi(~ s)
implies that a¤
i(~ s) · a¤
i(s):
Second, we claim that the function gi increases with si: The …rst claim
shows, in particular, that if si increases, while s¡i is constant, the number
of agents acting (weakly) decreases. Thus, the random variable Xi(si;s¡i)¡
Zi(si;s¡i) raises in terms of stochastic dominance, and the whole argument
o fL e m m a5a p p l i e s .
Now let d = s0
i ¡ si > 0. Precisely, we shall prove that
E¼i(si + d; ^ s
0
i) ¡ E¼i(si; ^ s
0
i) ¸ E¼i(si + d;^ si) ¡ E¼i(si; ^ si);
which is equivalent to (3).













: The two claims proved above yield that Xi¡
Yi º Xi ¡ Y 0
i :
E¼i(si + d; ^ si) ¡ E¼i(si; ^ si)=E(Xi + d ¡ Yi)
+ ¡ E(Xi ¡ Yi)
+:
E¼i(si + d; ^ s
0
i) ¡ E¼i(si; ^ s
0
i)=E(Xi + d ¡ Y
0
i )




U s i n gL e m m a5c o m p l e t e st h ep r o o f . ¥
Proof of Theorem 4. Let si be the true agent’s i …rst-period signal, and
consider k such that ¹ si(k) < ^ si · ¹ si(k ¡1): Since ^ s¡i is …xed throughout the
37argument, we suppress the notation. Truthful reporting brings the expected
utility of
E¼i(si;a(k))¡hi(si)=E¼i(si;a(k))¡hi(¹ si(k))¡E¼i(¹ si(k);a(k))+E¼i(¹ si(k);a(k+1)):
First, we prove that the agent i has no incentives to under-report her …rst-
period signal, i.e. to report ^ si <s i: Consider incentives the agent i with the
…rst-period signal ¹ si(k) faces. For any " such that ¹ si(k) ¡ ¹ si(k +1 )>">0;
she is indi¤erent between reporting ¹ si(k) and reporting ¹ si(k) ¡ ": Indeed,
the ’credibility payment’ is the same and the number of acting rivals is the
same (k+1). The single-crossing condition (3) assures that if the agent with
¹ si(k) is indi¤erent between reporting ¹ si(k) to reporting ¹ si(k) ¡ "; then the
agent with si > ¹ si(k) (weakly) prefers reporting ¹ si(k) to reporting ¹ si(k) ¡ ":
Thus, ^ si can not be less than ¹ si(k): (To rule out reports below ¹ si(k +1); one
can consider incentives the ¹ si(k +1)-agent faces.) It remains to show that ^ si
(weakly) exceeds ¹ si(k): So, we need to prove that
E¼i(si;a(k))¡hi(¹ si(k))¡E¼i(¹ si(k);a(k))+E¼i(¹ si(k);a(k+1)) ¸ E¼i(si;a(k+1))¡hi(¹ si(k));
or equivalently,
E¼i(si;a(k)) ¡ E¼i(si;a(k +1 ) )¸ E¼i(¹ si(k);a(k)) ¡ E¼i(¹ si(k);a(k +1 ) ) ;
but this is true by the single-crossing condition (3). Since the agent i having
the signal si is indi¤erent between reporting si and reporting any signal that
is larger than ¹ si(k) and does not exceed si; the proof that the agent i has no
incentives to under-report her signal is complete.
The proof that there is no incentives to over-report the signal is somewhat
symmetric. The si¡agent is indi¤erent between reporting the true signal
and reporting ¹ si(k¡1): Indeed, the mechanism assumes that the agents with
reports si and ¹ si(k ¡ 1) pay the same amount. Now, for any " such that
¹ si(k ¡ 2) ¡ ¹ si(k ¡ 1) >">0; the agent with ¹ si(k ¡ 1) is indi¤erent between
38reporting the true signal and reporting ¹ si(k ¡ 1) + ": To see this, note that
E¼i(¹ si(k ¡ 1);a(k)) ¡ hi(¹ si(k ¡ 1)) = E¼i(¹ si(k ¡ 1);a(k ¡ 1)) ¡ hi(¹ si(k ¡ 1))
¡E¼i(¹ si(k ¡ 1);a(k ¡ 1)) + E¼i(¹ si(k ¡ 1);a(k)):
By the single-crossing condition (3),
E¼i(¹ si(k¡1);a(k¡1))¡E¼i(¹ si(k¡1);a(k)) ¸ E¼i(si;a(k¡1))¡E¼i(si;a(k)):
Thus, if the ¹ si(k¡1) is indi¤erent between reporting the truth and reporting
¹ si(k¡1)+"; the si-agent (weakly) prefers to report ¹ si(k¡1) (which is pay-o¤
equivalent to reporting the truth), than to report ¹ si(k¡1)+": To show, that
^ si would not exceed ¹ si(k¡2); one should consider the incentives the ¹ si(k¡2)-
agent faces, etc. Therefore, the agent i has no incentives to over-report her
…rst-period signal.¥
Proof of Theorem 3. Lemma 4 proves that the payment schedule described
in Lemma 4 induces truthful reporting by agent i, provided that all other
agents’ reports are truthfull. The beliefs supporting the equilibrium in the
signaling stage are straightforward: if a payment by an agent i is de…ned by
(4), then the agents …rst-period signal is perceived to lie within the respective
range. In the subgame that starts after the …rst-period signals are revealed,
agents play according to the strategies described in Theorem 2.¥
Proof of Theorem 5. It su¢ces to observe that
si 2 argmax
^ si
fEv¼i(^ si;s¡i) ¡ hi(^ si;s¡i)g
for any s¡i and any si; and take sum over all s¡i:
Then note that all hi(^ si;s¡i) and thus the function H(si) increase in the
bidder’s i …rst-period signal si: This allows to use H(si) to report the true
value of si: Beliefs are straightforward.¥
Proof of Theorem 6.
39(i) The proof of existence is mostly analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.
Construction of an ex-ante equilibrium in the previous section used existence
of an ex-post equilibrium in a mechanism, where signaling payments are
allowed to be functions of announcements. Here we will use the same idea.
As an intermediate step for proving existence of robust equilibrium in an
"¡e¢cient mechanism, we consider a mechanism, where the discount is not
auctioned o¤ using an all pay auction, but rather bidders announce their
types in the signaling stage (much like in the signaling mechanism described
in Section 3). After the announcement, bidders make payments hi(b si;b s¡i) to
make the announcement credible, the bidder with the highest announced si
receives the "¡discount.
Rounds of the “intermediate”mechanism:
Round 1. After each agent privately learns si, all agents simultaneously
announce their types in the cheap talk stage. Afterwards, each agent must
make a payment of hi(b si;b s¡i): The agent with the highest …rst period an-
nouncement b s receives the discount coupon (ties are broken using a lottery).
Agents take action after observing announcements b s:
Round 2. After the third period signals v are revealed the object is sold
in a second price sealed bid auction.
We shall show that there exists a payment schedule hi(b si;b s¡i) such that
truthfull reporting supported by paying hi(b si;b s¡i) is an ex-post equilibrium.
The private value of the bidder with the highest …rst-period signal is
essentially boosted by the amount equal to discount ": We can introduce a
vector e s(s;b s) of “adjusted” private value signals, where e si = si + " if b si >
b sj = sj for all j 6= i; otherwise e si = si.( W e a r e a s s u m i n g b s¡i = s¡i;
and study the ith agent incentives to misreport the true signal si:) If all
the equilibrium reports b si a r et r u t h f u l ,t h e nt h es u b g a m ea f t e r" discount is
assigned is identical to the game considered in Section 3.1. The equilibrium
expected pay-o¤ of agent i of the subgame, which does not include signaling
40payments hi; is denoted by Ee ¼i(si; ^ si;s¡i).O n e c a n e x p r e s s Ee ¼i(si; ^ si;s¡i)
in terms of E¼i(si; ^ si;s¡i) using “adjusted” private signals. (For de…nition of
E¼i(si; ^ si;s¡i); see Lemma 3.) Let b e s denote a vector of perceived “adjusted”
signals of agents; the ith component of b e s is b e si = b e si(si;b si;b s¡i)=e si +(si ¡b si).
Essentially, e s is a vector of “adjusted” private value signals and b e s is public
perception about e s: Now we can write Ee ¼i(si; ^ si;s¡i)=E¼i(e si;b e si;e s¡i).
To prove that the separating ex-post equilibrium exists, we need to for-
mulate a single-crossing condition similar to (3).
Claim. For any N ¡ 1-tuple of truthfull reports s¡i; and any ^ s0







i;s¡i) ¡ Ee ¼i(s
0
i; ^ si;s¡i) ¸ Ee ¼i(si; ^ s
0
i;s¡i) ¡ Ee ¼i(si;^ si;s¡i) (7)
To prove the claim, we need to consider three cases: (a) the agent wins
the " discount if she makes announcement ^ s0
i but not ^ si; (b) an agent wins
the discount for either announcement ^ s0
i or ^ si; (c) neither ^ s0
i nor ^ si are high
enough to win the discount.
For (b) and (c), (7) follows immediately from Lemma 3. It remains





¡i is the largest component of the vector s¡i and s
¡m
¡i is an N ¡ 2-
dimensional vector that consists of all components of vector s¡i other than its
largest component sm
¡i: Applying the new notation, one gets Ee ¼i(si; ^ si;s¡i)=
Ee ¼i(si; ^ si;s m
¡i;s
¡m




¡i : Therefore, one can re-



















Let d = s0














which is equivalent to (8).
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As above, X0 º X: Then
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U s i n gL e m m a5c o m p l e t e st h ep r o o fo f( 8 ) .
Since (8) holds, there exists an ex-post separating equilibrium in the “in-
termediate mechanism”. Using existence of an ex-post equilibrium, we can
apply the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 5 to establish existence
of ex-ante separating signaling mechanism, where agents make signaling pay-
ments that are strictly increasing in their signals. This completes the proof
of existence.
Now we shall prove that any robust equilibrium is unique, fully separating,
and ’almost e¢cient’.
Step 1. In an equilibrium, the probability of any particular bid value H
in the signaling stage is zero. Indeed, if there is a positive mass of agents
that plays some Hmass with positive probability, then there is a positive
probability of a tie. Then an agent playing Hmass can increase the likelihood
of winning the discount ">0 by increasing her bid by an in…nitesimal
amount. Since the strategies are well-behaved, none of the agents would
increase their likelihood of taking actions. Thus, such a deviation would be
pro…table.
Step 2. Probability that players in the set ¡i take actions is denoted here
as p¡i: Let ¦(si;p¡i;s¡i) denote the pay-o¤ of player i i nt h es u b g a m ea f t e r
signaling payments H’s are sunk. We want to show that if p¡i ¸ p0
¡i then
for every s0










Essentially this condition says that any decrease in “…nal” private values
of player in the set ¡i is more valuable for player i with a larger …rst period
private signal. Inequality (9) follows from the proof of the single-crossing
condition of Lemma 3.
Step 3. Let us show that all robust equilibria are separating. In a robust
equilibrium, actions taken by players depend on their private signals and the
announcements of other players. Thus, we can write p¡i = p¡i(s¡i;H¡i;H i)
and p0
¡i = p¡i(s¡i;H¡i;H0
i): (According to Step 1 a tie is a measure zero
event; and thus have no impact on expected payo¤s.) For well-behaved
strategies p¡i ¸ p0
¡i for H0
i >H i (the inequality holds for all components).
Inequality (9) implies that H(s) is weakly increasing in s: Combining this
fact with result of Step 1, we conclude that H(s) is strictly increasing in s
(expect perhaps for a measure-zero set).
Step 4. Let us show that in equilibrium, pi(H¡i;H i(si);s i) is non decreas-
ing in si: Indeed, p¡i = p¡i(s¡i;H¡i;H i) is weakly decreasing in Hi.T h u s ,
according to single crossing condition, if agent with a …rst period signal si
acts with positive probability pi(H¡i;H i(si);s i) > 0; then any agent with a
signal s0
i >s i strictly prefers to act, and pi(H¡i;H i(s0
i);s 0
i)=1 .
Step 5. From Step 4, it follows that there exists a unique equilibrium in
the subgame that is consistent with a robust equilibrium strategy pro…le. In
this equilibrium, all agents with private values exceeding some critical value
s¤(H) act.
Step 6. From Step 5 and Theorem 2, it follows that "¡e¢cient mechanism
yields an e¢cient allocation with probability converging to one as " converges
to zero.
To establish uniqueness of the robust equilibrium, we use a standard
argument (e.g., Klemperer, 1999). Single-crossing condition (9) implies that
43dH(s)
ds is the same in any robust equilibrium. In Step 5, we showed that there
is a unique robust equilibrium in the subgame following the all-pay auction.
It remains to show that H(0) = 0: Suppose otherwise, say H(0) = H0 > 0:
For a player with si =0 , H(0) = 0 is a pro…table deviation: Indeed, after
this she does not change the perception of her type (she is correctly perceived
to have si =0 ). It was demonstrated in Step 4 that in a robust equilibrium
each player either acts with probability one or zero (except perhaps for a
set of measure zero). Thus, the above mentioned deviation can only cause
other players to increase the probability with which they act; however, given
the set of players that act, non of the players that do not act in a robust
equilibrium would choose to act. ¥
44